Yana Leonova, 33, a Belarusian citizen most recently residing in Russia, was extradited from France and charged with conspiring to violate the Export Control Reform Act, commit smuggling, commit money laundering, and defraud the United States. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in May 2022, Leonova allegedly used U.S.-based co-conspirators to procure and illegally export avionics and aircraft equipment to Russia—specifically for use on private aircraft operated by her former employer, a company identified on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List.
The scheme involved creating shell companies in Armenia, the Maldives, and elsewhere to transship controlled components without required export licenses, while repeatedly submitting false information to conceal the true end users and destinations. Leonova made her initial appearance in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia following her extradition, facing potential decades in prison if convicted.
Export Control Evasion Scheme
Following Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security imposed stringent controls restricting Russia’s access to aviation-related items, with license applications reviewed under a policy of denial. Any aircraft manufactured in the United States or incorporating more than 25% controlled U.S. content became subject to these requirements.
The indictment alleges Leonova and her co-conspirators repeatedly concealed the true end users and destinations when ordering components from U.S. suppliers, then arranged for transshipment to Russia through intermediary destinations—a common evasion tactic Russia has employed since the invasion. The financial component involved transmitting payments in U.S. dollars from foreign bank accounts to U.S. bank accounts, facilitating the purchases while obscuring the Russian end user.
Entity List and Aviation Sanctions
Leonova’s former employer’s presence on the Entity List identifies foreign parties whose activities are contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. government dramatically expanded Entity List designations targeting Russia’s aviation sector to degrade Russia’s military capabilities by cutting off access to critical aviation technology. Russian aviation programs rely heavily on foreign components, especially semiconductors and avionics. Russian media has reported that production of next-generation military aircraft stalled due to lack of foreign components and mechanical plants producing surface-to-air missiles shut down because of component shortages. The Commerce Department publicly identified 100 commercial and private aircraft that flew into Russia in apparent violation of export controls, making any subsequent maintenance, repair, refueling, or servicing of these aircraft prohibited.
Investigation and Charges
The case was investigated by the FBI’s Kansas City Field Office and the Bureau of Industry and Security’s Office of Export Enforcement in Atlanta and New York. Leonova’s arrest in France and subsequent extradition demonstrate the reach of U.S. law enforcement in pursuing export control violations. FBI Special Agent in Charge Stephen A. Cyrus acknowledged French authorities and the Department of Justice Office of International Affairs for their assistance. U.S. Attorney Jeanine Ferris Pirro stated that Leonova tried to circumvent U.S. law to enrich herself, using intermediary countries to block the identity of the final recipient in Russia.
Each charge carries severe penalties. Export control violations can result in up to 20 years imprisonment per count, smuggling charges carry up to 10 years, money laundering conspiracy can add another 20 years, and the fraud charge carries up to five years. If convicted on all counts, Leonova could face decades in federal prison.
Russia’s Procurement Networks
Leonova’s case exemplifies Russia’s widespread efforts to evade export controls through deceptive procurement networks. Since the February 2022 invasion, Russia has routinely relied on third-party intermediaries and transshipment points to disguise sanctioned parties and obscure true Russian end users. The Commerce Department has developed a Common High Priority List of 50 items Russia seeks to procure for weapons programs, with items like integrated circuits and radio frequency transceiver modules posing heightened diversion risks because of their critical role in Russian precision-guided weapons systems. The Treasury and Commerce Departments have issued multiple alerts urging vigilance for Russian export control evasion attempts.
FBI Warning
FBI Assistant Director Roman Rozhavsky stated that “to anyone considering helping a hostile nation-state obtain export-controlled technology, let today’s charges serve as a warning: the FBI and our partners will find you, no matter where you are, and bring you to justice.” The case may lead to additional prosecutions of unnamed co-conspirators in the United States.
Conclusion
Leonova’s extradition from France and prosecution in Washington demonstrates the U.S. government’s commitment to enforcing export controls that restrict Russia’s access to critical technology. The case illustrates how Russia continues to rely on intermediaries, shell companies, and false documentation to circumvent sanctions—and how U.S. law enforcement pursues these networks across international borders. With potential decades in federal prison if convicted, the prosecution sends a clear message to others involved in similar schemes. The indictment notes that all defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.












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