The Fall of Mehmet Fatih Baltaci and the Akfel Group

Mehmet Fatih Baltaci is a Turkish businessman best known as the founder and chairman of the Akfel Group, an energy conglomerate established in 1995. Together with his brother Murad Abdurrahman Baltaci, he built Akfel into one of Turkey’s leading private energy companies, especially in natural gas trading. The two brothers were the ultimate owners of Akfel Holding, the main holding company of the group, through 2015. All shares of Akfel were held by the Baltacı brothers until late 2015, when they transferred their stake to a Singapore affiliate amid rising legal and political risks in Turkey. Baltacı served as Akfel’s chairman and was also active in industry groups, including serving as President of Turkey’s Natural Gas Importers and Exporters Association. Under his leadership, Akfel Group expanded its operations over two decades, focusing on natural gas supply, power trading, and energy engineering services through various subsidiaries.

Baltaci’s prominence in the Turkish energy sector earned him significant influence. The Akfel Group became Turkey’s largest private natural gas importer, and Baltacı himself was dubbed “the prince of natural gas” in some circles. However, his business activities eventually became entangled with Turkey’s post-2013 political turmoil. Following corruption investigations in late 2013, which the government blamed on the Gülen movement, and especially after the July 2016 coup attempt, many businessmen associated with certain networks came under scrutiny. Baltacı reportedly left Turkey around 2014, relocating to Canada, as pressure mounted on businesses linked or perceived to be linked to the Gülenist network. By the mid-2010s, Baltacı was operating from abroad while still holding a controlling interest in Akfel via offshore entities. Despite his expatriation, he remained the key figure behind Akfel until Turkish authorities intervened in late 2016.

Building Turkey’s Gas Import Powerhouse

The Baltacı brothers, Mehmet Fatih and Murad Abdurrahman, positioned Akfel to capitalize on Turkey’s liberalizing energy market, focusing heavily on natural gas importation and trading. Their breakthrough came in 2012 when Turkey’s energy regulator EPDK granted Akfel a 30-year license to import Russian natural gas. The regulator split 6 billion cubic meters annually among four Turkish companies as part of opening the market to private firms. Akfel secured the largest allocation at 2.25 billion cubic meters per year, establishing it as the dominant private sector player.

The company operated through multiple subsidiaries holding separate import contracts with Gazprom. Akfel Gaz, Enerco Enerji, and Avrasya Gaz together imported up to 5.25 billion cubic meters of Russian gas annually, representing roughly one-fifth of all Russian deliveries to Turkey. At its peak, Akfel handled 55 percent of all private imports and controlled about 20 percent of Turkey’s total gas market, generating annual revenues around $500 million.

The Russian Connection Goes Deep

Gazprom and Gazprombank became deeply embedded in Akfel’s structure during the 2010s, forming a joint venture called Promak with 40 percent ownership of the holding company controlling Akfel’s import subsidiaries. Gazprombank secured a 60 percent joint venture in both Avrasya Gaz and Enerco Enerji, while Gazprom itself held a minority stake in Akfel Holding with options to increase its Akfel Gaz share. This made Akfel the main private conduit for Russian gas into Turkey. When Turkish authorities seized the company, Russian energy officials found their most effective Turkish partner suddenly controlled by government trustees.

The Offshore Restructuring Strategy

In December 2015, the brothers executed what Turkish prosecutors would later characterize as a deliberate concealment scheme. They transferred their shares in Akfel Holding to a newly created Singapore holding company, Akfel Commodities Turkey Holding A.Ş., established with just $100 in capital. The entire ownership structure moved offshore while authorities in Ankara were beginning to investigate FETÖ-linked businesses.

According to Turkish court documents, investigators from the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) later determined this transfer was designed to hide the brothers’ ownership and maintain control over Akfel’s operations despite mounting legal risks. The Singapore entity became the vehicle through which the Baltacıs attempted to shield their most valuable asset from Turkish seizure orders.

The TUSKON Connection and FETÖ Allegations

Turkish authorities built their case around Akfel’s alleged ties to TUSKON, the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists affiliated with Gülen’s movement. A May 2017 indictment targeted 86 suspects including TUSKON president Rızanur Meral, secretary-general Mustafa Muhammet Günay, and Baltacı, charging “membership in an armed terrorist organization.” The indictment initially faced procedural problems, with an Istanbul court returning it for revisions and temporarily setting aside charges against Baltacı on technical grounds.

Investigators concluded that Kaynak Holding, a Gülen-linked conglomerate, originally funded Akfel’s 1995 launch, making it part of FETÖ’s financial network from inception. In 2002, Akfel’s shareholding was restructured to list the Baltacı brothers as owners, replacing previous Gülen-affiliated shareholders on paper.

The Seizure and Murad Baltacı’s Conviction

After the July 2016 coup attempt, authorities arrested Murad Baltacı in September 2016. Three months later, the government appointed the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund as trustee over Akfel and its subsidiaries, dissolving the board and installing state administrators.

The timing created market chaos. Russian media reported Gazprom’s predicament: Turkish officials had simply taken over what Kommersant called Gazprom’s “most effective and profitable gas seller in Turkey.” Gazprom’s minority stakes fell into limbo.

A December 2021 trial convicted Murad Abdurrahman Baltacı of “knowingly and willingly aiding the armed terrorist organization without being a formal member,” sentencing him to three years and nine months. Four other defendants, including TUSKON vice chairman Rana Tezcan Açıkgöz, were acquitted. The court’s judgment described how FETÖ established a “closed loop” financing system through companies like TUSKON, determining Akfel had become central to FETÖ’s economic operations.

Separate Charges Against the Absent Chairman

While his brother stood trial in Istanbul, Baltacı remained abroad as a fugitive. Turkish prosecutors filed a separate case against the Akfel chairman in January 2020, seeking up to 15 years imprisonment for alleged FETÖ membership. This was a more serious charge than what Murad faced.

The evidence cited included detailed MASAK financial investigation reports tracing Akfel’s unusual share transfers to foreign entities. Prosecutors argued these moves, particularly the December 2015 Singapore transfer, were deliberate attempts to conceal assets on behalf of the Gülenist organization. The timing looked suspicious: the brothers moved ownership offshore just as authorities began targeting FETÖ-linked businesses.

Years of appeals followed. Finally, in April 2025, Turkey’s Supreme Court (Yargıtay) upheld the confiscation decision, permanently transferring Akfel Holding and all affiliated companies to the Turkish Treasury. The high court ratified the finding that the Singapore share transfer was a deliberate scheme to maintain an “organic link” to the business despite asset freezes.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning adopted what judges called a “closed vortex” analysis. The brothers, facing domestic asset freezes, created an offshore front company to continue controlling Akfel indirectly. This allowed the organization to give an international veneer to its business operations while cycling funds around to evade detection. The court ruled this scheme failed and ordered permanent forfeiture to the state.

Singapore Litigation: The Townsend Affair

After moving Akfel’s ownership to Singapore in late 2015, Baltacı hired Adam Townsend, an international energy consultant who had advised Akfel since 2009. In mid-2016, Baltacı negotiated a formal contract promising €45,000 monthly, a five-year term, and hefty liquidated damages if terminated without cause.

When Akfel’s Turkey-based management terminated this contract in March 2017, Townsend sued for breach. Akfel’s defense was extraordinary: the company claimed Townsend’s contract was a “sham orchestrated” by the Baltacı brothers to retain covert control while they concealed their involvement due to troubles in Turkey. The company argued the consultancy was part of an illegal scheme to evade Turkish law given the brothers’ “suspected involvement with certain terrorist groups.”

After initial appeals, Singapore’s Court of Appeal ruled in July 2019 that Akfel’s defense was questionable, requiring the company to post $2 million security before fully contesting the lawsuit. The judgment documented the ownership shuffle and alleged scheme to hide involvement due to terrorism investigations, turning a contract dispute into a window on the Baltacıs’ broader troubles.

International Arbitration: Taking on Turkey

Unable to recover their company through Turkish courts, the Baltacıs pursued international remedies. In September 2020, two foreign entities affiliated with the brothers, Akfel Commodities Pte. Ltd. (Singapore) and I-Systems Global B.V. (Netherlands), filed a claim against the Republic of Turkey at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

The case, registered as ICSID Case No. ARB/20/36, alleges Turkey’s actions constituted unlawful expropriation of Akfel’s assets. The claimants invoked bilateral investment treaties—the Turkey-Singapore BIT (2008) and Turkey-Netherlands BIT (1986)—which provide protections for foreign investments and allow investors to seek international arbitration against host states.

Specifically, the offshore companies argue that the takeover of Akfel Holding and its subsidiaries by the Turkish state violated treaty protections, and they seek compensation for the value of the seized enterprise. The claimants are essentially the Baltacı brothers’ offshore vehicles, indicating Mehmet Fatih Baltacı and his partners are behind the effort to recover losses through international law.

The ICSID arbitration remains pending. Turkey is being defended by international counsel, and the tribunal has not yet issued a decision. The brothers face an uphill battle: they must convince international arbitrators that Turkey’s seizure violated investment law, despite Turkish courts ruling the company was linked to a terrorist organization. Success could yield a substantial damages award, but ICSID enforcement against sovereign states is complex and uncertain.

The Broader Crackdown and Its Scale

The Akfel seizure was one chapter in a massive purge. Since the July 2016 coup attempt, Turkish authorities have taken over approximately 700 businesses worth $4 to $5.4 billion from individuals accused of Gülen links. International observers estimate total seized assets at around $50 billion, encompassing companies, schools, charities, media outlets, banks, and real estate.

Critics argue many seizures lacked due process and constituted collective punishment. Turkish authorities counter that the seizures were necessary to dismantle a network that attempted a violent coup and maintained a “parallel state” within Turkey’s institutions. By mid-2025, TMSF announced plans to auction Akfel Gaz and other group assets, converting seized properties into state revenue.

For Russia, the affair created diplomatic headaches. Business analysts interpreted Gazprom’s forced exit as signaling shifting Turkey-Russia relations. While Turkish authorities clarified gas supply contracts would continue under state management, Gazprom’s equity interests were written off and the company lost its most profitable Turkish distributor.

Conclusion

Baltacı’s fall from celebrated energy entrepreneur to international fugitive encapsulates the extreme risks Turkish businessmen faced during the post-coup crackdown. Turkish courts determined that Kaynak Holding’s original funding, the brothers’ ownership restructuring, and the 2015 Singapore transfer demonstrated an organic FETÖ connection spanning three decades. International arbitrators at ICSID will now review whether Turkey’s seizure violated investment law, potentially ordering hundreds of millions in compensation.

A company that once controlled 20 percent of Turkey’s natural gas market and maintained critical Russian partnerships no longer exists as a private entity. Its assets are being auctioned by the Turkish state, its founders live abroad as wanted men, and legal battles continue across multiple jurisdictions. The Akfel case exemplifies how quickly political winds can destroy business empires where rule of law is contested and terrorism allegations justify sweeping asset seizures. For Baltacı, the fall from “prince of natural gas” to fugitive took less than two years. The consequences will last a lifetime.